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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
Côte d’Ivoire’s 2015 Presidential Polls 
Giulia Piccolino 
Abstract: The 2015 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire was seen as an 
important test for the country given the 2010 post-election crisis. Al-
though the 2015 polls were peaceful, they were affected by problems not 
new to Côte d’Ivoire: lack of competition due to non-participation of 
major political actors, low voter turnout, mistrust in electoral institutions. 
The unpreparedness of the Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI) 
was also problematic, especially with respect to the revision of the voter 
list. Due to the boycott of partisans of former president Laurent Gbagbo 
and because of the support of the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes 
pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), President Alassane Ouattara’s re-
election was essentially a given from the start. With the ruling coalition 
firmly in control, Côte d’Ivoire appears stable. However, the country’s 
democratic deficit might lead to renewed violence once the RHDP has to 
pick Ouattara’s successor. 
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On 25 November 2015, Ivoirians went to the polls to elect their presi-
dent. Many observers still had fresh memories of the 2010 presidential 
election, which plunged the country into a crisis that led to at least 3,000 
deaths (Piccolino 2012; Bouquet 2011; McGovern 2011). In many re-
spects, however, the remarkably peaceful 2015 election was different. 
Due to the boycott of part of the opposition and the decision of the 
second-biggest member of the governing coalition, the Parti Démocratique 
de la Côte d’Ivoire (Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire, PDCI), to support 
incumbent president Alassane Ouattara, his re-election was inevitable. 
Ouattara won without a run-off, obtaining 83.7 per cent of the vote in the 
first round. Indeed, the voter turnout – which in the end totalled 52.9 per 
cent – attracted more attention than the results themselves.1  
While the absence of violence has encouraged optimism, the 2015 
election presented a series of striking similarities with Côte d’Ivoire’s 
pre-2010 elections. This might represent a step backward rather than a 
step forward with respect to democratic consolidation. A series of recur-
ring problems in the history of Ivorian elections – lack of competition 
due to non-participation of major political actors, low voter turnout, lack 
of trust in electoral institutions – affected the 25 October polls. The 
inability of Côte d’Ivoire to institutionalise democratic political competi-
tion does not bode well for the future. The 2020 presidential election, in 
which Ouattara will probably not participate, will be a crucial test. This 
article looks at the background of the 2015 election, analyses the differ-
ent phases of the electoral process, and assesses the implications of the 
recent polls for the future of the country.2  
The Legacy of the 2010/2011
Post-Election Crisis 
The history of Côte d’Ivoire since the introduction of multiparty politics 
in 1990 and the 1993 death of the first president, Félix Houphouët-
Boigny, has been marred by the manipulation of electoral rules and by 
the exclusion of certain groups and candidates (Bouquet 2007). In 1995 
Henri Konan Bédié, leader of the PDCI (formerly Côte d’Ivoire’s only 
1  The results of the 2015 election (CEI 2015), as well as those of the previous elec-
tions (CEI 2010), are published on the official website of the Commission Elec-
torale Indépendante. The CEI has, however, not published a breakdown of the 
results for all regions of Côte d’Ivoire, so the article will subsequently also refer to 
Abidjan.net, Côte d’Ivoire’s most popular online news outlet.  
2  I would like to thank Rodrigue Koné for his assistance and helpful comments. 
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party), won an election boycotted by the two other major Ivorian parties, 
Laurent Gbagbo’s Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front, FPI) 
and Alassane Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Républicains (Rally of the 
Republicans, RDR) (Crook 1997). In 2000 the Constitutional Court dis-
qualified the PDCI and RDR candidates, and FPI leader Laurent Gbagbo 
ran alone against former military ruler Robert Guéï. In protest, the RDR 
boycotted the following legislative elections (Bouquet 2011).  
The outbreak of an armed rebellion in 2002 can be partly traced 
back to the contestation of previous elections (Bouquet 2011; McGovern 
2011). The presidential election that took place in 2010, after having 
been postponed for five years, marked a break from previous elections in 
several respects (Bassett 2011). For the first time, the candidates of all 
three major parties participated, and voter turnout (83.73 per cent) was 
the highest ever in the history of Côte d’Ivoire’s multiparty elections. 
Key to Alassane Ouattara’s victory was the creation of the Rassemble-
ment des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (Rally of Hou-
phouëtistes for Democracy and Peace, RHDP), an electoral alliance 
between the PDCI, the RDR, and other minor parties. When Ouattara 
passed the first round, Bédié and the PDCI supported him against 
Gbagbo. Although the 2010 election was judged free and fair, it ended in 
violence. Gbagbo disputed the results and Ouattara needed the military 
support of the former insurgent group the Forces Nouvelles (New 
Forces, FN) and of French and UN peacekeepers to take power in April 
2011. Gbagbo was arrested and later transferred to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which indicted him for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Many of his supporters are still convinced 
that Gbagbo was the legitimate winner of the election and the victim of a 
neocolonialist plot (Piccolino 2012).  
The legacy of the 2010/2011 crisis and the polarisation between 
pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara supporters have continued to affect Côte 
d’Ivoire. The FPI boycotted both the 2011 legislative elections and the 
2013 local elections and posed a series of unrealistic conditions for its 
return to politics – in particular, the release of Gbagbo. Some fissures 
within the party had already appeared, however, as early as 2011, when 
the former president of the National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly, left 
the FPI. 
The government announced that crimes committed during the 
2010/2011 crisis were to be investigated and it instituted the Commis-
sion Dialogue Vérité et Reconciliation (Commission for Dialogue, Truth, 
and Reconciliation, CDVR). Transitional justice, however, deepened the 
discontent of Gbagbo’s supporters, since both the ICC and Ivorian 
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courts have focused on crimes committed by pro-Gbagbo personalities 
(Piccolino 2015b). The CDVR officially concluded its work in 2014. 
There was a general lack of clarity about its mandate, and its president, 
former prime minister Charles Konan Banny, did not provide effective 
leadership. Due to disputes between Konan Banny and the Ouattara 
government, moreover, the final report of the CDVR has not yet been 
made public; this has left the Ivorian public under the impression that 
the commission has not done its job.  
The Realignment of Alliances and
the Birth of the CNC 
The debate within the FPI about whether the party should take part in 
the election intensified in 2013 with the release from jail of Pascal Affi 
N’Guessan, official party president and former prime minister. Deter-
mined to be a presidential candidate, he found himself in conflict with 
the interim leadership of the party, headed by the vice president, Abou-
dramane Sangaré. After a contested internal congress, the clash between 
the factions went to court in 2014, and Affi N’Guessan obtained the 
exclusive right to use the party name and logo (Abidjan.net 2015b). In 
spite of this apparent victory, his efforts to style himself as Gbagbo’s heir 
encountered numerous obstacles. The splinter faction retained the sup-
port of the jailed former president, whom it elected new party chairman. 
The perception that the Ouattara regime backed Affi N’Guessan against 
Sangaré led to accusations of treachery from Gbagbo’s supporters. Affi 
N’Guessan, who was born in central Côte d’Ivoire, was moreover not 
well placed to gain the trust of the autochthonous populations of the 
southwest, who traditionally form the core of FPI support.  
In the meantime, in what became known as the Daoukro Appeal, 
Bédié declared his support for Ouattara and announced that the PDCI 
would not present a candidate (Konan Bédié 2015). Bédié, who could 
not run again for the presidency because of the age limits set by the Ivo-
rian Constitution, was accused by some members of his party of under-
mining the interests of the PDCI (Le Monde 2015). Three PDCI politi-
cians – former prime minister Charles Konan Banny, former leader of 
the PDCI youth wing Kouadio Konan Bertin (nicknamed KKB), and 
former minister of foreign affairs Amara Essy – decided eventually to 
run as independent candidates.  
Alienated by their official parties, the FPI hardliners and the PDCI 
dissidents tried belatedly to unite their forces. On 15 May 2015, a group 
of opponents including Konan Banny, KKB, Koulibaly, and representa-
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tives of the FPI-Sangaré wing signed a charter establishing the Coalition 
Nationale pour le Changement (National Coalition for Change, CNC) 
(Radio France Internationale 2015).3 The CNC charter stressed the im-
portance of ensuring a fair electoral process and securing respect for the 
Constitution, but it also hinted at a possible evolution of the CNC into 
an electoral alliance on the model of the RHDP (CNC 2015). However, 
the coalition included individuals with different political histories, whose 
opinions even about whether to participate in the election differed. In 
July, Konan Banny was elected chairman of the CNC (Fraternité Matin 
2015) but he did not achieve his goal of becoming its official candidate. 
In the end, the CNC was able to make the opposition more visible and 
its grievances more widely known, but it did not prove an effective 
electoral tool. 
The Voter Registration Process
One of the main sources of contention between the government and the 
CNC was the perceived lack of neutrality of the electoral institutions, 
particularly the CEI. The current electoral commission was created in 
2005 as part of peace negotiations. Its copious members, nominated on a 
fixed-term basis as representatives of the political forces that had signed 
the peace agreements, had little experience in organising elections.  
A revised law adopted in 2014 reduced the representatives of the po-
litical parties to four for the governmental coalition and four for the oppo-
sition, in addition to including, for the first time, five representatives of the 
main state institutions and four representatives of civil society organisa-
tions (CEI 2014). The CEI is thus dominated by pro-governmental mem-
bers. In view of the 2015 election, in a context where the technical and 
logistical support of the UN has been drastically scaled down, an even 
more pressing problem has been the commission’s lack of technical know-
how. With the exception of its president, Youssouf Bakayoko, most cur-
rent members of the CEI were appointed after 2013.  
The first serious test that the renewed CEI faced was the revision of 
the voter list. Ahead of the 2010 election, voter registration had been a 
contentious issue between Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s supporters. The 
final list covered less than 73 per cent of the voting population, accord-
ing to estimates by the National Institute for Statistics (Piccolino 2015a). 
For the 2015 election, the CEI used biometric voter registration for the 
second time. The same controversial firm that had provided the biometric 
3  Essy also expressed his support for the CNC, but refused to sign the charter. 
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technology in 2010 – Sagem Sécurité, since renamed Morpho – was again 
tasked with doing so (Piccolino 2015a). The CEI was hoping not only to 
update the list but also to significantly improve its coverage by enrolling 
approximately three million previously missing voters. However, the pro-
cess, launched on 1 June 2015, did not go as planned. Because of reduced 
financial and logistical support from international donors, the CEI cut 
down the number of centres where voters could enrol. Moreover, a na-
tional ID or a certificate of nationality was necessary to enrol (République 
de Côte d’Ivoire 2015), and the FPI-Sangaré encouraged a boycott of the 
operation. In the end, the 2015 voter list looked very similar to the 2010 
list, with only 344,295 voters having been added.  
The Pre-Electoral Atmosphere and
the Electoral Campaign 
On 10 September 2015, the Constitutional Council validated ten candi-
dates: Ouattara; Affi N’Guessan, candidate for the Alliance des Forces 
Démocratiques (Alliance of the Democratic Forces, AFD), a coalition of 
his wing of the FPI and some small parties; Mamadou Koulibaly, sup-
ported by Liberté et Démocratie pour la République (Freedom and De-
mocracy for the Republic, LIDER), a party he founded in 2011; the 
three PDCI dissidents, plus four other, minor candidates with little 
chance of gaining a significant share of the votes.  
Although Laurent Gbagbo was in jail at The Hague awaiting trial, he 
was very much present in pre-electoral debates. The shared strategy of 
the opposition candidates was to present themselves as men of reconcili-
ation, able to overcome the pro-Ouattara/pro-Gbagbo cleavage, and to 
court Gbagbo’s electorate. Many of them insisted that, if elected, they 
would do anything to set Gbagbo free (Miquel and Rosenberg 2015). 
However, none of the independent candidates managed to become 
genuinely popular. Hopes of mobilising Gbagbo’s voters vanished a few 
days before the polls when, through his spokesman Justin Katinan Koné, 
Gbagbo issued a statement requesting that candidates cease associating 
his name with their electoral campaigns (Katinan Koné 2015). 
In addition to Gbagbo’s fate, pre-electoral debate was dominated by 
polemics about the fairness of the electoral institutions. The CNC in-
sisted that the composition of the CEI was overwhelmingly favourable 
to the government and repeatedly asked for Youssouf Bakayoko to be 
replaced. Having announced the victory of Ouattara in 2010, Youssouf 
Bakayoko was seen as a partisan of the incumbent president and as a 
symbol of the post-election crisis. The Constitutional Council was also a 
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target of the opposition’s suspicions, especially after the resignation of its 
president, Francis Wodié, under dubious circumstances in February 
2015. The opposition saw the replacement of Wodié, a man regarded for 
his independence, with former justice minister Mamadou Koné, a long-
time RDR militant, as a way to secure the loyalty of the Constitutional 
Council to the incumbent president, especially with respect to the valida-
tion of Ouattara’s presidential candidature.  
Indeed, in the eyes of the opposition, Ouattara’s eligibility was in 
doubt because of article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution (Connection Ivoir-
ienne 2015). Considered a symbol of the divisive politics of ivoirité (Bou-
quet 2011), the article states that a presidential candidate should be of an 
Ivorian father and mother, themselves having been born Ivorian citizens; 
in addition, a candidate must never have claimed a nationality other than 
the Ivorian one. Longstanding doubts about whether Ouattara would be 
able to fulfil both criteria, and therefore be eligible, ultimately manifested 
in violence in September, when the CNC called for demonstrations to 
protest the Constitutional Council’s decision to validate Ouattara’s can-
didature. There were numerous clashes between pro-Gbagbo and pro-
Ouattara supporters, and in Gbagbo’s home region at least one demon-
strator was killed (Jeune Afrique 2015). 
The official start of the electoral campaign on 9 October highlighted 
the disproportional means available to the candidates. The government 
allocated XOF 100 million (approximately EUR 150,000) to each presi-
dential candidate for the campaign. This was, however, no match for the 
budget of the incumbent president, estimated to be at least XOF 10 billion 
(approximately EUR 15 million). Ouattara’s dominance was mostly evi-
dent in the omnipresence of his electoral posters in Abidjan, while the 
other candidates struggled to achieve visibility (Schneider 2015). 
While the discourse of the CNC candidates revolved to a very large 
extent around the 2010/2011 crisis and its aftermath and touched upon 
issues related to transitional justice and democracy, Ouattara’s campaign 
took a different approach. The incumbent president talked about the 
crisis as an episode that belonged to the past. His discourse focused on 
the economic successes of his government, his commitment to address-
ing youth unemployment and other social problems more resolutely 
during his second term, and his dedication to transforming Côte d’Ivoire 
into an emerging economy.4 The message conveyed was that, by focus-
4  See, for instance, Ouattara’s intervention on the TV show “Face aux électeurs,” 
where each candidate was invited to deliver a speech and then reply to journalists’ 
questions: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rw30vPx4rR0> (15 December 
2015).  
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ing on Gbagbo’s fate, the opposition wanted to keep the country in the 
past, and that Ouattara was best placed to address the daily needs of the 
Ivorian population.  
As the day of the polls approached, the opposition appeared disillu-
sioned. Claiming that the preconditions for transparent and fair elections 
had not been met, three candidates – Essy, Koulibaly, and Konan Banny 
– decided to withdraw from the race shortly ahead of the polls and join 
the FPI-Sangaré in calling for a boycott of the election (Konan Banny 
2015; L’Intelligent d’Abidjan 2015). 
The Voting Operations  
In spite of the polemical stance of the opposition, the election on 25 Oc-
tober took place without violence. In contrast to the 2010 election, ma-
jor international observer organisations such as the EU and the Carter 
Center did not send missions to the country, and the UN had no equiva-
lent of the 2010 certification mandate. However, local civil society orga-
nisations created observer platforms with international support and trai-
ning (Plateforme de Veille des Femmes et des Jeunes pour des Elections 
Apaisées et Crédibles en Côte d’Ivoire 2015; POECI 2015a). The Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also sent a dele-
gation chaired by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo.  
Overall, observers found that the voting operations had been fair 
and had taken place in a peaceful environment (Plateforme de Veille 
2015; POECI 2015a). However, they also denounced serious technical 
and organisational shortcomings. The majority of the polling stations 
were not able to open on time on the day of the election and the CEI 
was forced to extend voting times by two hours in places where there 
had been delays.  
Difficulties also affected the system of biometric voter verification. 
Each of the 19,000 polling stations should have been equipped with a 
biometric tablet in order to check the fingerprints of the voters. There 
were, however, problems in the distribution of the tablets, and the poll-
ing staff was not trained properly in their use. Election observers esti-
mated that in almost one-third of the polling stations the system failed at 
some point (POECI 2015b).  
The Results 
The CEI took three days to officially announce the final outcome. The 
provisional results, which gave the victory to Ouattara in the first round 
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with 83.7 per cent of the vote, were announced by Youssouf Bakayoko 
on 28 October. In spite of the harsh critiques of the electoral process 
mounted by the opposition, the only candidate who presented an appeal 
to the Constitutional Council was Koulibaly. The appeal was predictably 
rejected and Ouattara’s election was validated by the Constitutional 
Council on 2 November (Abidjan.net 2015e).  
Conscious that the incumbent president was going to win in any 
case, the opposition attempted to undermine his legitimacy by lowering 
voter turnout. There were considerable polemics about the accuracy of 
the rate of participation reported by the CEI, which, on 26 October, 
announced that total turnout had been approximately 60 per cent, before 
it revised the figure to 52.9 per cent upon the release of the election 
results two days later (Abidjan.net 2015c). Although turnout in 2015 was 
much lower than in 2010, the results show that the opposition’s strategy 
failed overall. Ouattara has not been able to massively expand his elec-
torate. Considering that the current voter list is incomplete, Ouattara’s 
share corresponds to 2,618,229 votes out of an Ivorian population of 
voting age estimated at nine million (Abidjan.net 2015a). Nevertheless, 
Ouattara has held onto his electorate and even slightly improved his num-
bers in terms of total votes obtained with respect to 2010 (Bouquet 2015). 
This was not an obvious result, given the trauma of the post-election crisis, 
the dissidence within the PDCI, and the non-competitive character of the 
election. The outcome can in part be attributed to the president’s control 
of the media, but also to his capacity to convince an electorate that wants 
peace above all that he is the best guarantor of stability.  
Winning a modest 9.3 per cent of the vote, well below Gbagbo’s 
45.9 per cent in 2010, Affi N’Guessan came in second. A breakdown of 
the results shows that, although the former prime minister has been 
unable to successfully sell himself as Gbagbo’s successor, he has man-
aged to at least co-opt a component of the FPI electorate, scoring de-
cently in several localities of central Côte d’Ivoire traditionally favourable 
to Gbagbo. The FPI-Sangaré has thus been reduced to the “ethnic core” 
of Gbagbo’s southwestern electorate. KKB, who did not join the boy-
cott and congratulated Ouattara on his victory before the official an-
nouncement of results, came in third with only 3.9 per cent of the votes.  
Conclusion: The 2015 Election and  
the Future of Côte d’Ivoire 
The picture that emerges from the 2015 election is one of substantial con-
tinuity. Ouattara’s success, the discipline of the PDCI electorate – who 
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bought into the Daoukro Appeal, the inability of Affi N’Guessan to con-
vince the majority of the FPI electorate to support him, and the failure of 
the independent candidates all serve to show that the three men who have 
dominated Ivorian politics since the death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny – 
Ouattara, Bédié, and Gbagbo – still do so today. This might come across 
as paradoxical, given that one of them is in jail and another is too old to 
stand for election. Regional results show that Ivorian politics has remained 
“frozen” also in terms of the anchorage of the main parties in specific 
ethno-regional blocks: the RDR and the PDCI are respectively supported 
by Ivorians of northern ethnicities (belonging to the North Mandé and 
Voltaic linguistic groups) and by the Baoulé of central Côte d’Ivoire, in 
spite of the two parties’ efforts to include politicians from other regions 
(the two recent general secretaries of the PDCI come from the same eth-
nic group as Gbagbo).  
The crisis of the pro-Gbagbo opposition has left the RHDP the un-
challenged protagonist of Ivorian politics. The next issue on the agenda of 
the leadership of the RHDP is the transformation of the coalition into a 
unified party. Considering that the RDR was born as a splinter faction of 
the PDCI, this would mean the de facto reconstruction of Houphouët-
Boigny’s single party. The RHDP, however, is at risk of becoming a nar-
rower and less inclusive version of the old PDCI. It is important to stress 
that Houphouët-Boigny took care to ensure that all ethnic groups in Côte 
d’Ivoire felt represented in the then-single party (Langer 2004; Akindès 
2004). Today, a significant minority, formed by the so-called “autochtho-
nous” populations of the southwest, support the FPI-Sangaré and feel 
marginalised by what they see as an alliance between “Northerners” and 
Baoulé. This minority’s marginalisation has been exacerbated by its ex-
clusion from electoral politics since 2010 and its subsequent lack of rep-
resentation.  
The second and perhaps even more alarming problem is that the 
dominance of the RHDP means that intra-party competition, rather than 
democratic elections, will be crucial in determining who will rule the 
country. Ouattara has already announced that he will respect the age 
limits set by the Constitution and will not run again in 2020. In five 
years, the RHDP will face the same problem that the PDCI faced after 
1993 – a problem at the heart of Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history of recur-
rent instability: picking a successor. The outbreak of a fratricidal struggle 
is looming: among the protagonists will probably be politicians that have a 
reputation for not shying away from violence, such as former FN leader 
Guillaume Soro and the powerful interior minister Hamed Bakayoko. 
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Ein Schritt vorwärts, zwei Schritte zurück?  
Die Präsidentschaftswahl 2015 in Côte d’Ivoire 
Zusammenfassung: Angesichts der politischen Krise in Côte d’Ivoire 
nach den Wahlen im Jahr 2010 galt die Präsidentschaftswahl 2015 als 
wichtiger Test für die Lage im Land. Die Wahl verlief friedlich. Allerdings 
traten Probleme auf, die in Côte d’Ivoire nicht neu sind: mangelnder politi-
scher Wettbewerb, weil wesentliche Akteure nicht an der Wahl teilnahmen, 
geringe Wahlbeteiligung sowie Misstrauen gegenüber der Wahlorganisa-
tion. Ebenso problematisch war die schlechte Vorbereitung durch die un-
abhängige Wahlkommission (Commission Electorale Indépendante, CEI), 
das gilt insbesondere für die Revision der Wählerliste. Weil Parteigänger 
des früheren Präsidenten Laurent Gbagbo die Wahl boykottierten und der 
amtierende Präsident Alassane Ouattara die Unterstützung der Rassemble-
ment des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP) besaß, 
war seine Wiederwahl von vornherein gesichert. Die regierende Koalition 
konnte die Kontrolle aufrechterhalten und das Land wirkt stabil. Aller-
dings könnte das Demokratiedefizit zu erneuten Gewaltausbrüchen führen, 
wenn in der RHDP die Nachfolge Ouattaras ausgehandelt werden muss. 
Schlagwörter: Côte d’Ivoire, Wahl/Abstimmung, Politisches System, Par-
teiensystem 
